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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
GARLEN E. DOUGLAS, \ 
Plaintiff and Respondent,~ 
vs. 
JACK I. GIGANDET, 
Defendant and Appellant, ( 
\ 
and ~ 
MRS. PHYLLIS GIGANDET, I 
Intervenor and Appellant.! 
Case No. 
8876 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
To more accurately state the facts, as set forth by the 
appellants in their brief, and to supplement the same, the 
respondent is compelled to make some repetition in the follow-
ing statement. 
On the morning of June 22, 1956, at about 8:00 o'clock 
the plaintiff and respondent herein, Garlen E. Douglas, left 
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his home in Monticello, Utah, and proceeded north on U. S. 
Highway No. 160, intending to travel to where this highway 
intersected with another public roadway known as the Peters 
Point road, located about seven miles north of Monticello 
(Tr. 4, 5, 6, 34, 35 & 36). Douglas was driving his 1954 
Willys Pickup truck, in which he was riding alone, and had 
his horse in the rear rack of the vehicle (Tr. 22 & 23). The 
weather was clear, the sun was shining, and visibility was good 
(Tr. 4, 20 & 51). 
When Douglas reached a point between 100 and 150 
feet South of the Peters Point road, he turned on the left 
blinker light on his truck, thereby indicating his intention to 
turn left at the intersection of these two roadways (Tr. 11, 14, 
15, 20, 24, 25, 28, 29, 47 & 87). This intersection is located 
on a curve and on a hill, sloping in the direction in which Doug-
las was traveling (Tr. 18, 51 & 63, Exhibits C & 3). At this 
time, Douglas looked in his rear view mirror, but saw no 
traffic behind him (Tr. 25). He just started to turn the front 
wheels on his vehicle to the left when he was struck from the 
rear by a 1952 Dodge Sedan vehicle, owned and being driven 
by Jack I. Gigandet (Tr. 26 & 65). Mrs. Phyllis Gigandet, 
intervenor and also appellant herein, was riding in the front 
seat with her husband at the time of the collision (Tr. 51 & 
74). 
Jack Gigandet testified he was traveling north on High-
way 160 and just before the accident, he came around the 
aforementioned curve and at that time saw the Douglas truck 
about 200 feet ahead, also traveling north, that it was in the 
lane for northbound traffic, and was below him on down the 
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hill at that place (Tr. 52, 63 & 83). Gigandet further testi-
fied that he continued his speed of 50 to 55 miles per hour, 
apparently didn't sound his horn, and when within about three 
car lengths of the Douglas truck, he began turning into the 
southbound lane, intending to pass the truck (Tr. 52, 63, 
64, 82, 84) . That at about the time Gigandet started to turn 
out to pass, the Douglas truck commenced a left turn into 
the Peters Point road, which road Gigandet says was not 
observed by him prior to the accident, and Gigandet then 
applied his brakes and attempted to avoid the collision (Tr. 
52, 53, 63, 84 & 85). The front of the Gigandet sedan 
collided with the rear of the Douglas truck, causing the latter 
vehicle to leave the west side of the two-lane highway, over-
turn, and come to rest on its right side, 7 4 feet northwest 
from the point of impact (Tr. 2, 9, 13, 15, 26, 29, 53 & 75 
-Exhibits 2 & D). The impact was so severe that it knocked 
the horse backward from the truck and the horse fell on to 
the hood and windshield of the Gigandet sedan (Tr. 65 & 
66). 
The investigating police officers established the hard 
surface of Highway 160 to be 26 feet wide, having one lane 
of traffic for each direction of travel, with a 2 foot shoulder 
on each side of the roadway (Tr. 10, 11, 12 & 21). The 
Gigandet sedan layed down 59 feet of solid black skid marks 
prior to impact and 36Vz feet from the point of impact to 
where it came to stop in the lane for northbound traffic (Tr. 
8, 20, 21). 
There was apparently a stop sign located on the 
southwest corner of the intersection for control of traffic 
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entering Highway 160 from the Peters Point road (Tr. 6, 17 
& 18). The impact point was established as being in the lane 
for northbound traffic and close to the intersection of the 
two roadways (Tr. 9, 26). The severity of the impact is 
further attested by the damages done to the Gigandet sedan 
and the Douglas truck (Tr. 29, 30 & 67-Plaintiff's Exhibit 
"D" and Defendant's Exhibit "2"), and the further fact 
that Douglas had the truck brakes on, that it was in low gear, 
a.nd that the truck traveled a distance of 74 feet before coming 
to rest on its right side (Tr. 9, 26, 36 & 3 7). Prior to the 
collision, the Douglas truck was equipped on the rear with 
two turn signal lights, with red reflectors, circular in shape 
and about 5 inches in diameter (Tr. 31, 32, 37, 38 & 39). 
The truck also had two stop lights on the rear end, each 
respectively located just below the two turn lights (Tr. 31 
& 32). 
Before the happening of this accident, the appellants 
were on a vacation trip from their home in Toledo, Ohio 
(Tr. 50 & 62). After touring some of the West, they intended 
to return via the Southern route, U. S. Highway 66, and visit 
Mrs. Gigandet's grandmother in Sioux Springs, Texas, on the 
way home (Tr. 62 & 63). Mrs. Gigandet was to alternate in 
driving with her husband on the trip and was assisting him 
in the driving of the vehicle by keeping a lookout and bringing 
to his attention other traffic on the roadway (Tr. 82). She 
had driven the car during the trip and prior to the accident 
(Tr. 82, 83 & 85). 
From the foregoing evidence, in which there was sharp 
conflict, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, 
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Jack I. Gigandet, and against the plaintiff, no cause of action, 
on the plaintiff's complaint; a verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the said defendant of no cause of action on 
defendant's counterclaim; and a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff of no cause of action on the cross-complaint of Phyllis 
Gigandet (Tr. 104 & 105). It is from this verdict and judg-
ment of the trial court entered thereon, that appellants Jack 
I. Gigandet and Phyllis Gigandet take this appeal ( R. 113) . 
The appellants set forth in their brief five separate points 
upon which they claim reliance for a reversal of this case but 
we agree with them in their statement that there are only 
two basic questions for consideration by this Court. Accord-
ingly, we shall consider them in the two statement of points 
hereinafter set forth. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING 
ITS INSTRUCTION NUMBER 3, THEREBY SUBMITTING 
TO THE JURY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT 
THE DEFENDANT JACK I. GIGANDET WAS GUILTY 
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN THE OPERA-
TION OF HIS AUTOMOBILE AT THE TIME OF THE 
ACCIDENT. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING 
ITS INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5, THEREBY SUBMITTING 
TO THE JURY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT JACK 
I. GIGANDET, IF ANY, COULD BE IMPUTED TO HIS 
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WIFE, PHYLLIS GIGANDET, WHO WAS RIDING WITH 
HIM IN HIS CAR. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING 
ITS INSTRUCTION NUMBER 3, THEREBY.SUBMITTING 
TO THE JURY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT 
THE DEFENDANT JACK I. GIGANDET WAS GUILTY 
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN THE OPERA-
TION OF HIS AUTOMOBILE AT THE TIME OF THE 
ACCIDENT. 
There is a sharp conflict in the evidence as to how and 
why this accident occurred. The appellants apparently can 
give no explanation for the collision except to say that an 
emergency situation was presented, as to them, by the acts and 
conduct of the plaintiff. In their brief, counsel for appellants 
quote at length their testimony to the effect that neither of 
them saw any signal given by the plaintiff that he intended 
to make a left turn at the intersection of Highway 160 and 
the Peters Point road, nor did they observe the brake lights 
on his truck prior to the collision. In further support of the 
contention that plaintiff had not signalled, appellants quote 
from his testimony on page 47 in the transcript to the effect 
that in a statement given by the plaintiff a couple of days 
following the accident, that plaintiff thought he had turned 
his left signal blinker for a left turn about 100 to 150 feet 
to the south of the aforementioned intersection and that al-
though he did not know for sure, he always did turn on his 
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lights and assumed he did at that time. In contrast to this 
evidence, we have the testimony of plaintiff to the effect 
that he had signalled his intention to turn, had applied his 
brakes and shifted his truck into low gear before coming 
to the intersection, and that he looked in his rear view mirror 
before any turn was made (Tr. 25, 26 & 27). The fact that 
plaintiff had signalled is corroborated by the two investi-
gating officers' testimony that the signal arm on the inside 
of the cab of plaintiff's truck was in a left hand turn position 
immediately following the accident (Tr. 14, 15 & 20). 
We now invite this Court's attention to what the appellant 
Jack I. Gigandet did or failed to do in the operation of his 
automobile which had some bearing upon the happening of 
this accident. He continued to travel at a speed of 50 to 
55 miles per hour, on a curve, and going down hill to the 
place where he came into close proximity with respondent's 
truck (Tr. 63, 64 & 82). Even though the highway was rela-
tively narrow and he saw the truck some 200 feet ahead of 
him at the time he came over the crest of the hill and around 
this curve, appellant Gigandet failed to slow his vehicle or 
even sound the horn so as to warn the respondent that he 
was about to pass (Tr. 51, 52 & 82). He also failed to see 
the intersecting Peters Point road, even though he was con-
siderably higher than the level of the intersection, and ap-
parently was not observing plaintiff's truck, because he did 
not see either the left blinker light flashing or notice the two 
brake lights which must have been on because respondent 
testified his brakes were applied before any impact, and that 
his truck left skid marks from the northbound lane to the 
westerly edge of the highway, after being struck from the 
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rear by the Gigandet vehicle (Tr. 36, 37, 63 & 67-Exhibits 
B, C & 3). 
It is our contention that from the foregoing facts in evi-
dence, the trial court was required to submit the issues of 
the negligence of appellant Jack I. . Gigandet to the jury as 
was done in its Instruction Number 3. In their brief, appellants 
apparently confuse this instruction by saying the court was 
then instructing the jury on contributory negligence, but as 
the record will show (R. 81 & 82), the trial court was merely 
setting forth the circumstances by which the appellant, Jack 
I. Gigandet, could be found guilty of negligence if the jury 
concluded that he had violated any duty owed the plaintiff 
in the respects therein set forth. It should be noted that appel-
lants ommitted from their quotation of Instruction Number 3 
the last paragraph thereof, and wherein the trial court further 
instructed the jury that even though they found the defendant 
Jack I. Gigandet guilty of negligence and that such negligence 
was a proximate cause of the collision, they could not find a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff if at the same time they found 
the plaintiff was guilty of any negligence which proximately 
contributed to the cause of the collision. We see nothing wrong 
in this instruction based upon the evidence adduced at the 
trial. It clearly defined to the jury the circumstances under 
which they would be justified in finding the appellant Jack I. 
Gigandet guilty of negligence which proximately caused or 
proximately contributed to the happening of the accident. 
On the other hand, we fail to follow the reasoning of counsel 
for appellants wherein they urge in their brief that this in-
struction placed a higher degree of duty upon the appellant, 
Jack I. Gigandet, than was justified under the conditions. 
10 
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All of the evidence in the case is contrary to their contention, 
now urged for the first time, that the Peters Point road was 
a private road or driveway and not within the purview of 
Section 41-6-7 (a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, defining a 
"street or highway" as: 
"The entire width between the boundary lines of 
every way publicly maintained when any part thereof 
is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicu-
lar travel." 
There is no evidence in the record that the Peters Point road 
was other than a public roadway and it was certainly not a 
"private road or driveway" as defined in subsection (b) of the 
aforementioned statute, and as contended in appellants' brief. 
The evidence was to the effect that it had a wide graveled 
shoulder where it intersected with Highway 160 and that a 
stop sign was placed so as to control traffic entering the main 
highway from the west (Tr. 12, 13 & 17-Exhibit 3). With 
this evidence before it, the trial court properly submitted this 
issue to the jury as one of the elements of fact for determination 
in view of Section 41-6-58 (a) (2), Utah Code Annotated, 
195 3, which prohibits the driving of a vehicle to the left 
side of the roadway when approaching within 100 feet of or 
traversing any intersection or railroad grade crossing. We fail 
to see wherein Section 41-6-59, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
has any application to the facts of this case and accordingly 
cannot agree with appellants wherein they contend that as 
a prerequisite to the giving of this Instruction Number 3, the 
evidence should either show that the intersection in question 
was plainly marked with appropriate signs or that it was 
such that a reasonable and prudent driver using due care 
1l 
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could have seen it. There are numerous public roads through-
out Utah which are not posted to warn travelers of an inter-
section ahead and certainly any number of them are obscured 
from observation by trees, foliage, peculiarity of construction, 
or for some other reason cannot be readily seen without keep-
ing a reasonable and proper lookout. It is thus our position 
that the question of lookout on the part of Jack I. Gigandet 
and whether by reason of inattention he failed to see the 
intersection where Peters Point road entered Highway 160, 
were questions for the jury to determine from all of the facts 
and circumstances. The evidence indicated this was a rear 
end collision, wherein appellant's vehicle struck the rear end 
of respondent's truck while the latter was slowing down to 
make a turn, and while we were surprised that the jury found 
contributory negligence on the part of respondent, neverthe-
less, that finding seems conclusive. 
It is elementary that matters of negligence, contributory 
negligence and proximate cause generally are jury questions, 
unless evidentiary facts are of such conclusive character as 
to require all reasonable minds to conclude that ultimate 
fact of negligence, contributory negligence or proximate cause 
does or does not exist. 
See: lOA and lOB Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Auto-
mobile Law and Practice, Perm. Ed., Sections 6594, 
6600 and 6618. 
This Court is committed to that principle in numerous 
cases, a few of which are: 
Earle vs. Salt Lake & Utah Ry. Corp., 109 Utah 
111, 165 P. 2d 877. 
12 
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Hayden vs. Ceclerlund, 1 Utah 2d 171, 263 P. 2d 796. 
Gibbs vs. Blue Cab, 122 Utah 312, 249 P. 2d 213, 
on rehearing 259 P. 2d 294. 
Jensen vs. Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 196, 271 P. 2d 838. 
Applying the foregoing principles to our instant case, 
we respectfully submit that the trial court did not err in sub-
mitting the foregoing questions to the jury for its determina-
tion under adequate and proper instructions. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING 
ITS INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5, THEREBY SUBMITTING 
TO THE JURY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT JACK 
I. GIGANDET, IF ANY, COULD BE IMPUTED TO HIS 
WIFE, PHYLLIS GIGANDET, WHO WAS RIDING WITH 
HIM IN HIS CAR. 
/ 
It is our contention that the trial court properly submitted 
to the jury the issue of whether the contributory negligence 
of Jack I. Gigandet, if any, could be imputed to appellant, 
Phyllis Gigandet, and we do not agree with appellants' view 
that the lower court erred in giving Instruction Number 5 
to the jury, and in refusing to give their requested instructions 
3, 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
We respectfully submit that the evidence adduced relat-
ing to imputed negligence created a question for the jury 
to be resolved by it from all of the facts and circumstances. 
13 
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The appellants each testified that they were on a vacation 
trip for their mutual enjoyment (Tr. 51, 62, 82 & 83). Phyllis 
Gigandet had driven a car for some 12 years (Tr. 75) and 
had been alternating in the driving of the vehcile on this 
trip (Tr. 51, 62, 82, 83 & 85). Mrs. Gigandet further testified 
that she had been assisting her husband in the driving of the 
car by keeping a lookout ahead and bringing to his attention 
things that may have been on the roadway during the time 
he was driving (Tr. 82). She also testified that they were 
going to ·visit her grandmother in Texas on the return tour 
home and that was one of the purposes of the trip and was 
for their mutual benefit (Tr. 62 & 83). Just before the accident, 
Mrs. Gigandet saw respondent's truck moving slowly on the 
highway ahead but failed to warn her husband until just 
before the impact with the rear of it (Tr. 84). This fact is 
further established by Jack Gigandet's testimony that his speed 
of 50 to 55 miles per hour at impact was about the same as 
at the time he first saw respondent's truck (Tr. 57 & 63). 
Thus the foregoing facts demonstrate that Mrs. Gigandet 
at least had to some degree a right of control over the vehicle 
her husband was driving, even though the title to the car was 
registerd in his name, and he was actually driving at the time 
of the collision. We disagree wtih counsel for appellants when 
he says that the fact that a husband and wife are on a vacation 
trip together does not make it a "common purpose" because 
we can conceive of no reason for them being together in such 
a situation other than for a community of purpose with a 
common destination. By the giving of Instruction Number 5, 
the trial court properly submitted this issue of joint venture 
to the jury for determination from the facts adduced to show 
14 
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right of control in the operation of the vehicle by Mrs. Gi-
gandet. In this instruction, the trial court said in part: 
"In order to find that they were engaged in a JOlnt 
venture, you must find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that they were in joint or common possession 
and operation of the automobile in pursuance of such 
purpose with both having rights to be heard in its 
control and management. If you find such to be a 
fact, then they are both responsible for the operation 
of the automobile and the contributory negligence, if 
any, of the defendant is imputed to the cross-com-
plainant, his wife,a nd she cannot recover." 
The trial court then went on to state in said instruction 
that there was no presumption raised that they were engaged 
in a joint enterprise by the fact that they were husband and 
wife, nor did the fact that Mrs. Gigandet was not at the wheel 
of the automobile at the time of the collision, standing alone, 
preclude a finding that she and her husband were engaged 
in a joint venture of the kind that makes his negligence imput-
able to her (R. 85). 
This Court has considered this proposition m a well-
reasoned opinion by Mr. Justice Wolfe in the case of Fox vs. 
Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 59 P. 2d 1049, which involved an 
action brought against a wife riding in a vehicle owned by the 
husband and wife for injuries arising out of an accident which 
occurred while the automobile was being driven by the husband 
on an errand for the wife. Even under those facts, this Court 
held that the question of whether or not the wife was respon-
sible for her husband's negligence was for the jury and that 
any presumption created by vanous factual relationships be-
15 
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tween the parties in any of a number of given situations are 
presumptions rebuttable by evidence. 
This doctrine has been since affirmed in Ida M. Johnson; 
Adm'x. vs. Arthur Hardman, et al, 6 Utah 2d 421, 315 P. 
2d 854. 
Since the verdict of the jury on this proposition of im-
puted negligence was supported by substantial evidence, resolv-
ing the disputed issues in favor of the respondent and against 
the appellant, Phyllis Gigandet, that judgment should not be 
disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the trial court did not err 
in its instructions to the jury, nor in refusing to give certain 
requested instructions of the appellants, and that the verdict 
and judgment appealed frorr should not be disturbed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HURD, BAYLE & HURD and 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1105 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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